Context Dependence

If words and concepts receive meaning only in sequences of differences, one can justify one's language, and one's choice of terms, only within a topic...and an historical strategy.
–pg. 70

Not terribly novel but well put. I highlight this because we're getting to the end of the section and this passage appears to be part of where J.D. winds up to his point.

This also seems to locate him on the left ends of the subjective/objective and idealist/realist spectra, which is like big surprise, but I've wondered how much of the linguistic turn in 20th century philosophy is really just the old idealist/realist debate dressed up in linguistic terms. There seems to be a general form of epistemological paradox where you direct your skepticism at some property of yourself that allows to form an argument in the first place. For Descartes that property was sense perception, hence the whole "evil demon" am-I-really-dreaming conundrum which still gets some airplay. For a linguistically-minded philosopher like Derrida, that property is language, the way that words can never quite say what we want them to say–which is a different issue but conforms to the same general outline of the paradox.